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THE FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
DIVORCE
ROBERT E. MELDMAN* AND KAREN CASE RYAN**
The tax aspects of divorce can no longer be considered inciden-
tal. An amicable property settlement may produce devastating tax
consequences; alimony and child support which seem reasonable
before taxes may result in inadequate funds after taxes; an agreea-
ble allocation of dependency exemptions by the parties may have
no effect for tax purposes. Therefore, the attorney who is familiar
with the various recurring tax consequences of a divorce can aid
his client in minimizing the tax burden. As a practical matter of
course, both parties must work together to produce the lowest
possible combined tax.
THE INCOME TAX RETURN
One of the first tax problems confronting a couple in the pro-
cess of a divorce or legal separation is the filing of their current
income tax returns.' Generally, the tax liability on a Federal "joint
return" will be less than the combined tax liabilities of two "sepa-
rate returns". 2 Therefore, if the parties are willing to cooperate, a
joint return should be filed.3
The right to file a joint return is determined by the "marital
status" of the parties on the last day of each year.4 Thus, while a
marital dispute is pending, the couple retains their right to file a
joint return even if they are not living together on the last day of
* J.D. 1962, Marquette University Law School; LL.M. (Taxation), 1963, New York
University School of Law; Member, Meldman Limited, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Chairman,
Taxation Section, State Bar of Wisconsin; Lecturer in Taxation, University of Wisconsin -
Milwaukee.
** J.D. 1966, Marquette University Law School; LL.M. (Taxation), 1973, New York
University School of Law; Associate, Meldman Limited, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Lecturer
in Taxation, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee.
1. The article will assume both parties are cash basis, calendar year taxpayers.
2. The tax rates of § 1(a), "Married Individuals Filing Joint Returns" are lower than
the tax rates of § l(d), "Married Individuals Filing Separate Returns." [Unless otherwise
specified all references are to the Intenal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.]
3. When a couple files a joint return they are jointly and severally liable for the tax or
deficiency under § 6013(d)(3). However, under § 6013(e)(1), an innocent spouse will not be
held liable for any deficiency if he does not benefit from the unreported income. See,
Raymond H. Adams, 60 T.C. 300 (1973). [The parties could provide by written agreement
that one spouse would indemnify the other in the event a deficiency is later assessed.]
4. § 6013(d)(l)(A).
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the year.5 The fact that the individuals are divorced or legally
separated at any time after the close of the taxable year does not
deprive them of their right to file a joint Federal income tax return
for the preceding taxable year.' They may continue to file joint
returns for each year, until the year in which the divorce becomes
"final."
In Wisconsin, a divorce does not become final until the expira-
tion of six months from the date of the granting of the judgment.7
Although the Wisconsin Statutes do not refer to "interlocutory
decrees or judgments of divorce," the Internal Revenue Service has
ruled that Wisconsin divorces are "interlocutory" for tax purposes
and a husband and wife may file a joint return for the taxable year
that ends within the six month waiting period.8 Therefore, if a
divorce judgment is granted on or after July 1st, the couple will
still be considered as "married" on December 31st of that year and
may elect to file a joint return for the year.
Since determination of an individual's marital status, for in-
come tax purposes, is made on the last day of the taxable year,
being "married" affects an individual's filing requirements, as well
as the itemized and standard deductions available. A married cou-
ple need not file a Federal income tax return unless their combined
gross income is $2,800 or more, and a single individual is not
required to file a Federal income tax return unless his gross income
is at least $2,050. However, a "married person" who does notfile
a joint return with his spouse must file a return if his gross income
exceeds $750.1 In addition to the lower filing requirements for
"marrieds filing separately," the allowable standard deductions
are reduced to one-half of the amount normally allowed. The per-
centage standard deduction of "15% of adjusted gross income or
$2,000, whichever is less," is reduced to 15% of adjusted gross
income but not in excess of $1,000.1 Similarly, the low income
allowance of $1,300 is reduced to $650 for each taxpayer."
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(a).
6. For example, if an action for divorce was started in 1973 and the judgment of divorce
was not rendered until January, 1974, the parties were "married" at the end of 1973 and
could file a joint Federal income tax return for the calendar year 1973.
7. WIs. STATS. § 247.37(l)(a) (1971).
8. REv. RUL. 59-266, 1959-2 C.B. 377 dealt with Wis. STATS. § 245.03(2) and § 247.37
(1957) which provided for a one year waiting period. Since the change in the 1969 Statute
related to the time of the waiting period, REv. RUL. 59-266 would still seem to be effective.
9. § 6012(a)(1).
10. § 141(b).
II. § 141(c).
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And furthermore, when separate returns are filed, both spouses
must either itemize their deductions or use the same type of stan-
dard deduction on their respective returns. One spouse cannot
itemize his deductions and the other elect one of the standard
deductions; 2 nor can one spouse use the low income allowance
while the other spouse uses the percentage standard deduction. 3
In an effort to relieve a spouse who has either been abandoned
or must bear the brunt of child support from the punitive nature
of the general filing requirements, Congress created the so called
"Abandoned Spouse" statute.14 Under this section, a "married"
person filing separately may be entitled to the full amount of either
the 15% standard percentage deduction or the $1,300 low income
allowance if:
(1) He maintains as his home a household which constitutes for
more than one-half of the taxable year, the principal place of
abode of a dependent son, stepson, daughter or stepdaughter;"
and
(2) He must be entitled to the dependency exemption for the
child; 6 and
(3) He furnishes over half of the cost of maintaining such
household during the year; and
12. § 142(a). If either spouse itemizes deductions, he controls the election of the couple
and the other spouse must also itemize deductions, even if the standard deduction would
have resulted in less tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.142-1(b).
For example: A couple decides to file separate returns. The husband has adjusted gross
income of $30,000 and itemized deductions of $5,000; he itemizes his deductions on his
separate return. The wife had adjusted gross income of $10,000 and deductions of $400; she
must itemize her deductions even though her standard deduction would have been $1,000
(15% but not to exceed $1,000 for separate returns).
13. § 141(d)(1). If either spouse elects the percentage standard deduction, he controls
the election for the couple, and the other spouse must elect the percentage standard deduc-
tion, even if the low income allowance would have resulted in less tax liability. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.141-1(0(1).
For example: A couple decides to file separate returns. The husband has adjusted gross
income of $10,000 and the wife has adjusted gross income of $4,000. If the husband elects
the standard deduction of $1,000, the wife must use the standard deduction on her separate
return, even though the low income allowance would be $650 and her standard deduction is
only $600 (15% of $4,000).
14. § 143(b).
15. A child will qualify as a dependent under § 152(a)(1) or (2) if the taxpayer provides
over half of the support for the child. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i) defines support as
including shelter, food, clothing, medical and dental care, education, etc. See, John C.
O'Connor, T.C. Memo 1973-35 where rent or the fair rental value of lodging was considered
shelter.
16. A dependency exemption will be allowed under § 151(e)(l)(B) if the child is under
the age of 19 or the child is a student. For a discussion as to which parent is entitled to the
exemption, see Dependency Exemption supra.
19741
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(4) During the entire taxable year his spouse was not a member
of such household.
17
A taxpayer who can fulfill the above requirements possesses the
dual tax advantage of filing as a "single" person and qualifies for
the lower Head of Household tax rates. 8
ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
When the divorce decree requires one spouse to make payments
to or for the benefit of the other spouse, 9 the question raised is:
Do the payments qualify as "alimony" for tax purposes? The de-
cree's labeling of some payments as "alimony" and others as
"property settlement" is not controlling. In addition, a couple need
not be divorced in order for payments to be treated as alimony for
tax purposes. If a court orders temporary support payments during
a proceeding, 0 or if payments are made pursuant to a legal separa-
tion,2' they may qualify as alimony. Even payments made under
the terms of a voluntary written separation agreement where no
legal action is pending may be considered alimony. 2
17. An example of the "Abandoned Spouse" provision: If a husband removes himself
from the family household in November of 1973, the wife cannot make use of this provision
on her separate 1973 income tax return. But, if the couple remains apart and are not
divorced (final) or legally separated during 1974, she may take advantage of the "Aban-
doned Spouse" provisions on her separate 1974 income tax return.
18. § l(b) and § 2(c). § 2(b)(1)(A)(i) does not require a divorced or legally separated
taxpayer to be entitled to the dependency exemption.
For example: If a judgment of divorce was granted before June 30, 1973 and the husband
is entitled to the dependency exemptions for children in the custody of the wife, she may
use Head of Household rates on her 1973 income tax return because the divorce was final
prior to the last day of the year. However, if the judgment of divorce was granted on or
after July 1, 1973, the wife must be entitled to at least one child's dependency exemption in
order to use the lower rates of Heads of Household.
19. Under Wis. STATS. § 247.23(1) and § 247.26 (1971), either party may be required
to make alimony payments. Under § 7701(a)(17), the words "husband" and "wife" are
interchangeable for alimony purposes. For convenience, the husband will be considered the
spouse required to make the alimony payments.
20. § 71(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(3)(i).
21. § 71(a)(l).
22. § 71(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(ii), applies to written separation agreements
executed by the parties after August 16, 1954. But see Mavity v. Comm'r, 341 F. 2d 865
(2nd Cir. 1965), (65-1 USTC 1 9272), where the husband was allowed to deduct lump sum
arrearage paid pursuant to a new agreement executed after the statute was enacted, even
though timely payments made pursuant to a pre-1954 agreement would not have been
deductible. See, Welford E. Garner Jr., T.C. Memo 1973-79 where payments pursuant to
an oral agreement did not qualify for alimony treatment.
Assume on January 1, 1973, a couple separates on a trial basis and the husband agrees
to pay the wife $200 per month during the period of separation. On June 1, 1973, the parties
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Although the Internal Revenue Code does not use the word
"alimony" as such, it does require the wife to include in income,
in the year received, "periodic" payments from the husband in
discharge of his marital obligation to support her.23 Correspond-
ingly, if the wife is taxed on the payments, the husband is entitled
to a deduction 24 in the year he makes the payments. 25 However, the
payments are neither taxable to the wife nor deductible by the
husband unless the parties are living apart and file separate Federal
income tax returns. 26
Payments are "periodic" if it is arithmetically impossible to
determine a total sum. 27 For instance, if payments are indefinite in
amount, i.e. based on a percentage of the husband's variable sal-
ary, or payments are for an indefinite period, i.e. to continue until
the wife dies or remarries, or until there is a change in the eco-
nomic status of either party the payments qualify as alimony. 28
On the other hand, if payments are of a fixed amount over a
definite period of ten years or less, the payments will not be treated
as "alimony" for tax purposes. 2 For example, if the husband is
execute a written separation agreement which provides for the payments to the wife. Only
$1,400 of the total payments of $2,400 will be treated as alimony for 1973. During 1974, all
payments will be treated as alimony.
23. § 71(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-I(b)(5).
24. § 215; but deductions must be itemized; Treas. Reg. § 1.215-1(b) provides that the
deduction is only allowed to the obligor spouse and an estate, trust, corporation or any other
person who pays the alimony obligation cannot deduct the payments.
25. In Sarah L. Narischkine Estate v. Comm'r, 189 F. 2d 257, (2nd Cir. 1951), (51-1
USTC 9 9313) affg. 14 TC 1128 (1950) alimony arrears covering several prior years and
received in a lump sum were taxable and deductible in the year paid. See also, REV. RUL.
67-11, 1967-1 C.B. 15, and Holloway v. U.S., 428 F. 2d 140 (9th Cir. 1970), (70-2 USTC 1
9548), where a lump sum payment, made to satisfy past, present and future obligations
under a divorce decree, which was less than the aggregate amount of arrearages was consid-
ered an arrearage of alimony, taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband.
26. § 71(a)(2); and Howard Bogard, 59 T.C. 97 (1973), and REv. RUL, 73-409 IRB
197341, where a written separation agreement executed during the divorce proceedings
providing for payments to the wife until the divorce becomes final need not recite that it is
the intention of the parties to remain separate and apart if, in fact, they are living apart
and the agreement states the amount of the payments. See also Marion S. DelVecchio, T.C.
Memo 1973-245, where the court held that a divorced husband was not living separate and
apart and could not deduct payments to the wife when he lived in the same house with his
ex-wife, though not as husband and wife.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(b).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(d)(3)(ii)(a) provides that the payments must be subject to some
future uncertainty which is specified in the instrument or which is automatically imposed
by local law. REv. RUL. 72-133, 1972-13 C.B. 13.
29. § 71(c)(1); Lemasters v. Comm'r, 72-2 USTC 9612 (7th Cir. 1972), affg. 30 TCM
218 (1971); William M. Hardy, 59 T.C. No. 84 (1973) where a husband was required to
make alimony payments until the wife's death or remarriage and if she remarried to pay
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required to pay the wife $100 per month for nine years, this is equal
to a "principal sum" of $10,800 and cannot be considered alimony
because it is possible to arithmetically determine a total sum from
the amount of payments and their duration.30 However, where a
principal sum paid in installments is to be over a period of more
than ten years from the date of decree, order or agreement, the
payments will be treated as "alimony" provided they are based on
the husband's marital obligation to support the wife.3' For in-
stance, if the example above is modified so that the payments are
$75 per month for twelve years it would be alimony even though
the principal sum is $10,800 because the payments are now being
made for a period in excess of ten years.
Installment payments of a principal sum are taxable to the wife
in the year received, and deductible by the husband in the year
actually paid, to the extent of 10% of the principal sum.32 This
limitation may result in a portion of the payment being nontaxable
and nondeductible. For an illustration, assume that the husband is
to pay the wife $150,000 over a period of fifteen years as follows:
$20,000 each year for five years and $5,000 per year thereafter. The
husband may deduct and the wife must include in income only
$15,000 (10% of $150,000) of each $20,000 payment during the first
five years. For the remaining ten years, both must consider the full
$5,000 payment.
If installment payments initially qualify for alimony treatment,
a prepayment option in the agreement will not void the fact that
the payments "may" be made over a period in excess of ten years,
even though they are actually made in less than ten years.3 3 How-
her $5,000. The Court held the $5,000 payment to be a principal sum nondeductible because
it was made in a lump sum payment even though it was intended to replace the support
payments.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(b); George B. Kent, Jr., 61 T.C. 17, (1973). However,
if the husband is required to pay the wife $100 per month for nine years, or until she
remarries, whichever comes first, these payments would qualify as alimony and would not
be considered a principal sum since the total amount cannot be calculated because of the
contingency of remarriage. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(5).
31. § 71(c)(2).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(d)(4) provides that if the payments are to terminate upon the
happening of an indefinite event, they will not be treated as a principal sum and the 10%
rule will not apply.
33. Irving J. Hayutin, T.C. Memo 1972-127 where the court stated that it is not neces-
sary for there to be absolute assurance that payments will, in fact, continue for more than
ten years. But see Wallace v. Comm'r. 73-2 USTC 1 9649 (10th Cir. 1973), affg. 58 T.C.
629 where the court held an original decree which provided that the principal was to be paid
within nine years and six months from the date of the decree is controlling, and the pay-
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ever, since the 10% limitation is applicable, careful attention
should be given to irregular payments and to prepayments.
When the wife receives cash payments in exchange for her
interest in family property, they are not treated as alimony, even
if paid over a period in excess of ten years, but are considered part
of a property settlementu
Therefore, sometimes the parties will agree to increase the
amount of alimony payments and combine them with the cash
portion of a property settlement so that both are taxable to the wife
and deductible by the husband. In Houston v. Commissioner,"
the husband transferred to his wife a residence, insurance policies,
an automobile, jewelry, other personal property and a large sum
of cash within two months of the divorce decree and agreed to pay
her $300,000 in equal installments over a period of twelve years.
The Tax Court held that cash transferred shortly after the divorce
was in the nature of a property settlement and did not constitute
alimony. But, a small amount of cash payable shortly after the
decree may be considered part of a principal sum." On the other
hand, where a decree designates payments as being for the wife's
release of her marital rights and not as a property settlement or
vice versa, the courts usually attempt to construe the wording of
the decree in light of the wife's contribution during the marriage.
However, there are no positive rules which will predict what the
decision of the court will be. 7
ments are not deductible as alimony even though the husband was not able to make the
payments within the time specified in the decree and the parties entered into an agreement
reducing the monthly payments and extending their time period in excess of ten years.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4); Huston v. Comm'r., 442 F. 2d 40 (7th Cir. 1971), (71-1
USTC 1 9381) affg. 52 TC 815, (1970); Remstrom v. U.S., 220 F. Supp. 688 (D. Nebr. 1963),
(63-2 USTC 9609).
Most of the reported cases involving the tax treatment of cash payments are a direct
result of the spouses' inconsistent treatment of the payments on their respective income tax
returns. Upon audit by the Internal Revenue Service of both returns, a deficiency is assessed
against one of the spouses. If he is successful in his contest with the Service, the other spouse
will receive a deficiency notice. However, a decision regarding a dispute between the Com-
missioner and one spouse is not resjudicata in a later dispute between the Commissioner
and the other spouse. Harry Blum v. Comm'r., 177 F. 2d. 670 (7th Cir. 1949) and Tillie
Blum v. Comm'r., 187 F. 2d. 177 (7th Cir. 1951).
35. 442 F. 2d. 40 (7th Cir. 1971).
36. Hilgemeier v. Comm'r., 42 TC 496 (1964). But see, REV. RUL. 73-392, IRB 1973-
39 where during preliminary negotiations the husband agreed to pay the wife SI,500 per
month for eleven years, but the agreement provided that the monthly amount would be
$1,400 for eleven years and that the additional $100 per month would be paid in a lump sum
of $13,200 within six months after the divorce decree. The Service ruled that the $13,200 is
not part of the principal sum. To the contrary, Sechrest v. U.S., 73-1 USTC 9394.
37. George C. DeSmyter, T.C. Memo, 1973-90, where the court disregarded terms of
1974]
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Transfers of property from one spouse to the other may result
in additional tax liability. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Davis,3 held that if a husband discharges his marital obligation
to support his wife by transferring appreciated property to her, it
is treated as a sale;39 the fair market value of property transferred
is equal to the marital rights surrendered." Accordingly, the hus-
band recognizes gain on the difference between his basis and the
fair market value of the property on the date of transfer. 1 A caveat
must be noted; a loss on such a transfer may not necessarily be
deductible." Receipt of property by the wife is not a taxable event
for her, and it is not considered alimony. 3 The fair market value
an agreement entitled "Property Settlement" which stated no alimony would be allowed to
the wife; Walter H. Weiner, 61 T.C. 19 (1973) where the agreement provided that "in full
satisfaction of the wife's rights during her life to support and maintenance, the wife would
receive $400 per month until the sum of $29,000 was reached or until the wife died." The
court found that the labels attached to the payments were not controlling and that the $400
per month were for the wife's property rights and not alimony; Nancy Cole Miller, T.C.
Memo 1973-131 where the agreement provided that the husband was to pay the wife $100
per week for her interest in jointly held real estate and that the property was transferred to
a trustee until $52,000 was paid. The court held that the payments were alimony since the
wife could not establish that she made any substantial money contribution toward the
purchase of the real estate and also, the payments were to terminate upon the wife's death;
Marion R. Hesse, 60 T.C. 72 (1973) where the agreement purported to be a complete
settlement of property rights and the wife waived her right to support. The court held that
the amounts received by the wife were in lieu of alimony since it was not shown that the
wife had any interest in the property she was relinquishing. See also, Raymond K. Beatty,
T.C. Memo 1967-200; Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964), (64-2 USTC
9709).
38. 370 U.S. 65 (1962), (62-2 USTC 91 9509).
39. Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56 (1973) where the husband's transfer of stocks by
private agreement antecedent to their divorce was treated as a sale.
40. REv. RUL. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414, which ruled that transfers of property pursuant
to a divorce decree are not subject to gift tax on the grounds that there is adequate consider-
ation; Estate of H.B. Huntley, 52 T.C. 495 (1969). But, under § 2516 transfers of property
pursuant to a written agreement which is not followed by a decree of divorce within two
years is subject to the gift tax.
41. If the transfer occurs prior to the divorce decree, § 1239 may preclude the husband
from capital gain treatment. See also § 1245 and § 1250 which treats part of the gain on
depreciated property as ordinary income.
42. If the transfer occurs before the divorce decree, § 267 precludes the husband from
taking a deduction for the loss, and in the case of personal use property a loss is never
allowed. But see William E. Robertson, 55 T.C. 862 (1971) where a loss was held deductible
under § 165(c) when one spouse sold his interest in jointly held business property to the
other.
43. The husband is not allowed to deduct the fair market value of the property trans-
ferred. § 215 allows a deduction only if the wife must include it in income. (However, a
husband's desire to terminate all future contact with his wife may overcome his desire to
lessen his tax burden and he may prefer a transfer of property in lieu of monthly payments,
deductible as alimony.)
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of the property at the time of transfer becomes the wife's basis for
the property.
Additional tax liability may be incurred by either spouse if a
settlement involves an exchange of assets" unless the exchange is
merely an equitable division of jointly held property.4s However,
gain would be recognized if one spouse's interest in jointly owned
assets is purchased by the other, even if the transaction is ordered
by a court.
INDIRECT ALIMONY PAYMENTS
Household expenses such as rent, utility bills and medical ex-
penses may be eligible for alimony treatment.46 The husband may
deduct and the wife must include in income that portion of current
expenditures paid by the husband from which the wife derives an
"economic benefit. ' 47
When the husband is required to make mortgage payments, the
principal and interest may be considered alimony if the payments
extend beyond a ten year period or if the husband's obligation can
be terminated upon the occurrence of a future indefinite event,"
provided the wife's equity in the mortgaged property is increased
and protected by the husband's payment.4" Thus, if the property is
solely owned by the wife, she would realize an economic benefit
each time the husband makes a payment on the mortgage and such
44. An exchange of stocks, bonds and personal use property would be treated as a sale,
but an exchange of other investment property, would come within the nonrecognition rules
of§ 1031.
45. Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. No. 7 (1973) where local law required an equitable
division of the property of the marriage, regardless of legal title and the court held such a
division was not a tax free transfer if property was not jointly owned.
46. For example, if a decree, order or agreement provides that the husband must pay
the wife's rent, the rental payments may be considered alimony provided they are based on
the marital obligation to support.
47. Seligmann v. Comm'r., 207 F. 2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953), (53-2 USTC 9580). Melvin
A. Christiansen, 60 T.C. 49 (1973), (1973-2 USTC 786), where payments were considered
alimony when they discharge the wife's personal obligation and confer a direct economic
benefit upon her.
48. REv. RUL. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17, provided the payments are to cover a period of
more than ten years from the date of the decree; Josephine D. Cothran, 57 T.C. 296 (1971)
where payments may be terminated on the happening of a contingency; and see, H. RuDIcK,
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE AND ITS TERMINATION, 112 (1964).
49. REV. RUL. 67-420, 1967-2 C.B. 63. But see, Elbert G. Sharp, T.C. Memo 1972-159,
where the court held the husband's payment of the mortgage were part of a property
settlement rather than alimony. The court considered the fact that the wife had made the
down payment and had substantially contributed to the acquisition of property during the
marriage.
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payments would be considered alimony. Conversely, payments on
property which is solely owned by the husband are not treated as
alimony even if the wife is in exclusive possession of the property. 0
Of course, the husband would be entitled to the normal deductions
for the interest on the mortgage and the real estate taxes. 5'
When property is jointly owned by the husband and wife, only
one half of the principal and interest payments on the mortgage
will qualify as alimony. For example, if the total payments for the
year were $3,000, consisting of $2,000 principal and $ 1,000 interest,
the husband would be allowed to deduct and the wife must include
as income $1,500 ( /2 of $3,000) as alimony. Since the wife is taxed
as if she constructively received one-half of the mortgage payments
and applied it herself, she is entitled to an interest deduction of $500
( / of $1,000), and the husband's deduction for interest is limited
to $500.2 The payment of real estate taxes on jointly owned prop-
erty is not considered alimony because the husband is protecting
his own interest in the property; however, he is allowed a deduction
for the total amount of taxes paid.53 The tax treatment of pay-
50. The wife's right to rent-free occupancy of the family home is not alimony. James
P. Bradley, 30 T.C. 701, (1959), held there were no "payments"; Pappenhiemer v. Allen,
164 F. 2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947), (47-2 USTC 1 9384); but see Neely B. Taylor, 45 T.C. 120
(1965) where the husband gave up the fair market value of his right to occupy the house.
The right to occupy a house for life or for a term of years is a property interest. The wife
is considered to have either a life estate or an interest for a term of years (depending on
the agreement) and the husband has the remainder interest. If the husband should die first,
the value of his remainder interest in the property would be includible in his estate. § 2031
and Treas. Reg. § 1.2031-10(d).
51. § 163 and § 164.
52. REV. RUL. 67-420, supra note 49. Similarly, if the agreement provided that the
husband is to pay the wife $10,000 per year for fifteen years; the wife is to retain possession
of the jointly owned house but must assume complete responsibility for the remaining
mortgage payments which have eleven more years to run, then the total amount of the
husband's payments would not be considered alimony. Assume the mortgage payments are
$2,400 per year. During the first eleven years, the husband may deduct $8,800 ($10,000 less
one-half of $2,400) per year as alimony plus one-half of the amount of the mortgage
payment that represents interest and the wife must include in income $8,800 as alimony and
may deduct one-half of the amount of the mortgage payment that represents interest.
During the last four years, the entire $10,000 is both deductible and taxable as alimony.
If the remaining life of the mortgage were only nine years and the total payments were
not subject to any contingency, only $7,600 ($10,000 less the $2,400 that must be applied to
the mortgage) qualifies as alimony during the first nine years. During the last six years, the
entire $10,000 is both deductible and taxable as alimony.
53. REv. RUL. 62-38, 1962-1 C.B. 15; REv. RUL. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17; and see REv.
RUL. 71-268, 1971-1 C.B. 58 which provides that while the parties are married either the
husband or the wife may deduct the amount of property taxes and interest on the mortgage
which the party actually pays on jointly held property; no gift is considered to be made to
the other co-tenant. If real estate taxes were considered alimony, the tax consequences
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ments for homeowner's insurance on jointly held property is not
certain. Conceivably, if the terms of the mortgage require such
insurance, one-half of the payments might be considered alimony.
In the event the mortgage payments are designated as child
support in the decree or if the property is transferred to the chil-
dren, directly or in trust, no portion of their allocable share of the
husband's payments for the mortgage, property insurance, real
estate taxes and maintenance will qualify for alimony treatment."
The tax consequences of life insurance premiums paid by the
husband will depend on the ownership of the policy and whether
the wife receives an "economic benefit" from such payments. If the
life insurance policy is owned or absolutely assigned to the wife and
she is the irrevocable beneficiary, the premiums are deductible by
the husband and includible in the wife's income. But, if the policy
is contingently assigned to the wife or she is designated as a contin-
gent beneficiary, the premiums are not deductible by the husband
nor are they includible in the wife's income. Of course, if the
policy is assigned to the wife in trust for the children or the children
are the beneficiaries, no part of the premiums are alimony.
Payments by the husband of the wife's medical and dental
expenses, including medical insurance, are taxable to the wife and
deductible by the husband.57 The wife may consider the payments
as part of the medical expenses which are used in the computation
of her medical deduction, if she itemizes. 8 If the husband pays the
would be similar to the interest payments on mortgages. The husband would be allowed to
deduct one-half as alimony and one-half as taxes. The wife would include in income one-
half of the taxes as alimony and simultaneously deducts it.
54. Illene Isaacson, 58 T.C. 659 (1972), where it was stipulated that the husband was
allowed to deduct the interest payments; and see Charles E. Upton, T.C. Memo 1973-217
where the husband transferred his interest in property to the wife for life, remainder to the
children and the decree provided that he was to continue to pay the mortgage, real estate
taxes and insurance as child support. The court held that the payments were not alimony.
55. Anita L. Ellis, T.C. Memo 1973-152.
56. REV. RUL. 70-218, 1970 C.B. 19; Veil v. Comm'r., 240 F. 2d 584 (2nd Cir., 1966),
(57-1 USTC 9246), where a husband's gratuitous assignment of a policy insuring his life
to his wife with ownership reverting to him if she dies first was held to be merely a
contingent beneficiary and the premium payments were not taxable to her as alimony. And
see, Seligmann v. Comm'r., 207 F. 2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953), (53-2 USTC 9580), where the
Seventh Circuit held that life insurance premiums are not alimony unless the wife's "eco-
nomic benefit" from payments of the premiums can be measured in dollars and cents. If
the right to receive the proceeds is subject to contingencies, such as in cases where she must
survive the husband or must remain single, her "economic benefit" cannot be measured and
the premiums are not includible in the wife's income.
57. REV. RUL. 62-106, 1962-2 C.B. 21; F. Ewing Glasgow, 21 T.C. 211 (1953) Acq.
58. § 213; but the wife may not deduct the children's medical expenses unless she is
entitled to their dependency exemption. See Dependency Exemption, supra.
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children's medical and dental expenses, such payments are not
considered alimony unless the wife is responsible for the payments
under the terms of the decree or agreement.59 If health insurance
covers the wife and the children, the wife is required to include the
entire premium paid by the husband in her income unless the
agreement or decree specifically allocates a percentage of the
premium for the children.60 Similarly, if the children are living with
the wife, the total amount of the husband's payments of their
utility bills will be treated as alimony. Utilities are considered
expenses of current enjoyment and the wife receives an economic
benefit through the husband's payments."
In instances where an agreement or a decree requires the wife
to include in her income the husband's payments which are in-
tended by the parties to be alimony and to pay the tax thereon, but
which are not alimony for tax purposes, she is not liable for the
tax under the Internal Revenue Code and the husband is not enti-
tled to deduct such payments." Conversely, if the payments do
qualify as taxable alimony and the husband agrees to pay the wife's
tax, she remains obliged to report such payments as income and is
personally responsible for the tax. 3 Presumably, where such ar-
rangements are enforceable under local law, the husband must
reimburse the wife for the taxes she paid, but such reimbursements
will be considered additional alimony which is also taxable.64 This
involves the troublesome question of pyramided taxes.65 As an
alternative, the amount of the alimony payments should take into
consideration the wife's additional tax liability and should be in-
creased accordingly.
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
Usually, as a result of a marital dispute, one spouse will be
required to make payments to the other spouse for the support of
the minor children.66 When the terms of a separation agreement,
59. Melvin A. Christiansen, supra note 47.
60. Deinenger v. Comm'r., 313 F. 2d 221 (4th Cir. 1961), (63-1 USTC 1 9220).
61. REv. RUL. 62-39, 1962-1 C.B. 17.
62. § 215 states ". . . there shall be allowed as a deduction amounts includible under
Section 71 in the gross income of the wife ... "
63. Neeman v. Comm'r., 200 F. 2d 560 (2d Cir. 1952), (53-1 USTC 9147) affg. 13 T.C.
397 (1949).
64. Mahana v. U.S., 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. C1. 1950), (50-1 USTC 9164).
65. REV. RUL. 58-100, 1958-1 C.B.31.
66. Under Wis. STATS. § 247.23 and § 247.26 (1971) either party may be required to
make child support payments. For convenience, the husband will be treated as the party
required to make such payments.
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court order or decree specifically states the purpose of such pay-
ments, they do not qualify as alimony. 7
When a husband's payments for alimony and support fall in
arrears, the wife need only include in income the amount which
exceeds the required child support. For example, if a divorce decree
provides for alimony of $2,400 per year and child support of $3,000
per year and the husband's total payments are $4,100 during the
year, the first $3,000 is considered child support and cannot be
deducted; the remaining $1,100 is treated as alimony, includible in
the wife's income. Consequently, the husband is allowed to deduct
only such excess.68
This general rule disallowing deductions for child support may
be controverted if the decree, order or agreement does not
specifically state that a portion of the payments to the wife are to
be used for the child support and all payments received by the wife
are treated as alimony. For instance, if the decree states that a
husband is to pay the wife "$4,000 per year for alimony and child
support", the husband may deduct and the wife is taxed on the
entire $4,000. In the landmark decision of Commissioner v.
Lester,9 the Supreme Court held that the total payments to the
wife could not be allocated between the wife and the children, even
though the terms of the instrument indicated that the parties in-
tended such allocation." In Saralee Lust71 the parties clearly in-
tended that the purpose of $200 per month was for child support,
but the divorce decree did not specifically designate it as such.72
67. § 71 (b) excludes from alimony "part of any payment which the terms of the decree,
instrument, or agreementfix, in terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment, as
a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of the husband." For instance,
assume a divorce decree requires the husband to pay "$150 a week to the wife, $100 of each
payment to be used for the support of the children." The child support payments totalling
$5,200 per year are neither deductible by the husband nor taxable to the wife because the
decree fixes $100 per week as child support.
68. George R. Joslyn, 230 F. 2d 871 (7th Cir. 1956); and § 71(b).
69. 366 U.S. 299 (1961), (61-1 USTC 1 9463).
70. The Court based its decision on the fact that under the terms of the instrument, the
wife was free to enjoy the money as she pleased, even though under local law she was under
a duty to use part of the payments solely for child support. See, Shirley Slack Martin, T.C.
Memo 1973-228 where a court order did not fix the amount of the payments for child
support, but the husband's letter to his wife stated that the entire payment was for child
support. The Tax Court held that the court order must govern and the wife was taxed on
the amount.
71. T.C. Memo 1971-67, affd 73-2 USTC 9627 (9th Cir. 1973).
72. The decree provided that the husband was obligated to pay $350 monthly for three
years, $250 monthly thereafter. Payments were to-be reduced to $200 per month in the event
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Although the Tax Court was very sympathetic to the wife, it stated
that its hands were tied and the $200 must be treated as alimony.
Therefore, if the parties intend that the wife should not be taxed
on child support, the instrument must specifically state the exact
amount which is to be used for the children. But, if the parties wish
to have both alimony and child support taxable to the wife and
deductible by the husband, the instrument must be carefully
worded .13
If a written separation agreement does not specifically desig-
nate the amount for child support and it is later incorporated in a
temporary alimony order or a divorce decree, the child support
payments will continue to be treated for tax purposes as alimony. 74
However, if the court accepts such a written agreement but enters
a judgment which specifically fixes the amount to be applied for
child support, then the amounts paid after the decree are not de-
ductible by the husband or taxable to the wife. Similarly, if child
support payments are treated as alimony because of the wording
of the original decree but later a court reviews and recharacterizes
the payments, amounts paid after such recharacterization are not
alimony for tax purposes.7"
DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS
Dependency exemptions for children of divorced parents
usually become an item of controversy and negotiation, because
both parents tend to claim the dependency exemptions on their
respective returns. Congress enacted a simple "solution" to this
controversy by providing that the parent who had custody of the
child for the greater portion of the year would normally be entitled
to the dependency exemption. 76 However, there are two exceptions
Mrs. Lust remarried; $125 per month when the older child reached 21; and ceased entirely
when the younger child reached 21. No part of the monthly payments were labelled child
support.
73. Joseph N. DaCanto, Lumping Child Support andAlimony, J1 505 (Prentice-Hall, 2-
17-1972) for further details and form.
74. REv. RUL. 70-557, 1970-2 C.B. 10.
75. Cleveland J. Harris, 51 T.C. 980 (1969) where payments designated alimony in the
agreement of the parties were characterized as support payments under the decree pursuant
to Louisiana Law; Jeanette Fosburg, T.C. Memo 1971-186, where payments stated in the
separation agreement incorporated in the decree were ambiguous, but the divorce decree
characterized them as child support. And see Homer H. Hewitt III, T.C. Memo 1972-251,
where alimony was discontinued after the wife's remarriage by the reviewing court, and
future payments were designated child support.
76. § 152(e)(1) requires that over one-half of the child's total support must be provided
by the parents and that the child must be in the custody of at least one parent for more
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to this general rule whereby the parent having custody may not
necessarily be entitled to the dependency exemption.
The first exception allows the non-custodial parent the depend-
ency exemption if he contributes $600 or more per year for the
support77 of each child, and the divorce decree or a written separa-
tion agreement provides that he is to have the exemptions.78 For
example, if a decree provides that the mother is to have custody
of the couple's three children, and the father is to pay $1,800 ($600
per child) in support payments and the decree further provides that
the father is entitled to the dependency exemptions for the children,
the father will be allowed the deduction for tax purposes even if
the mother provides an additional $2,500 for the support of the
children. This first exception enables the parents to decide the
exemption issue and allocate the deductions irrespective of the
financial burden.
The second exception provides that a non-custodial parent is
entitled to the dependency exemptions for all the children if he
provides more than $1,200 in total for child support during the year
(regardless of the number of children) and the custodial parent
does not clearly establish that she provided a greater amount for
child support.79 Assume a decree provides that the mother shall
retain custody of the couple's three children and the father is re-
quired to pay support of $1,800 per year ($600 per child) for which
he is to receive the three dependency exemptions while his pay-
ments are current. If he pays only $1,200 ($400 per child) during
the year, the father is not allowed any dependency exemptions
under either the decree or the first exception since the $600 per
child requirement is not met. However, he will be allowed the
exemptions under the second exception if the mother cannot prove
that she has contributed more than $1,200 for the support of the
children during the year. Therefore, although the first exception
theoretically enables the parents to decide the exemption issue,
under the second exception the non-custodial parent is allowed the
than one-half of the year.
77. Supra note 15 for the definition of support.
78. § 152 (c)(2)(A); Vernon L. Sheeley, 59 T.C. 531 (1973) where there was no written
agreement and a statement by the presiding judge during the divorce proceedings to the
effect that the couple had agreed that the husband is entitled to the dependency exemption
does not fulfill the requirements of § 152(e)(2)(A)(i) if it is not incorporated in the decree;
but see Ronald C.G. Bridgett, T.C. Memo 1972-160 where a handwritten note from the
wife to the husband stating she would not claim the children as dependents was held to a
"written" agreement for the purposes of § 152(e)(2)(A).
79. § 152(e)(2)(B); Labay v. Comm'r., 450 F. 2d 280 (5th Cir. 1971).
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dependency exemptions even though the divorce decree or written
agreement provides to the contrary."s In another example, the de-
cree provides that the mother is entitled to custody and to the
dependency exemptions for the couple's six children, and it further
provides that the father is to pay a total of $1,200 per year as child
support. If he does make the payments, the mother loses the ex-
emptions despite the Court decree unless she can prove by clear
and convincing evidence that she has provided more than the
amount provided by her husband. Thus, the second exception has
caused the greatest controversy and has increased litigation.
When the non-custodial parent claims the exemptions based on
the second exception and the custodial parent claims the exemp-
tions based on the divorce decree, the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides that each parent is entitled to receive from the other an
itemized statement of expenditures upon which claims are based s.8
In determining amounts provided by the non-custodial parent,
child support payments are considered only to the extent they are
actually made during the year.82 Arrearage payments of amounts
for which the parent is liable under the terms of the decree or
agreement are not treated as being paid either during the year the
payment was due or during the year the payment was actually
made,8 3 and prepayments made prior to the year they are due are
not treated as being made during a subsequent year. 4 In addition
to the required support payments, the non-custodial parent may
also include any allowable amounts spent for the support of the
children for which there are cancelled checks or receipts." Once the
80. Treas. Regs. § 1.152-4(d)(3); William G. Wohner, T.C. Memo 1972-237.
81. § 152(e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.52-4(e) which requires the parent claiming the depend-
ency deduction to attach to his return both his and his wife's itemized statements. See Treas.
Reg. § 1. 152-4(e)(3) for contents of the statement.
82. § 152(e)(2); REv. RUL. 72-591, 1972-2 C.B. 84.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(iii)(a); and Bobby R. Casey, 60 T.C. 68 (1973), where
the court ruled that arrearages in child support which are paid in the current year but are
in excess of the obligation for child support payments for the current year, could not qualify
as part of the child support payments with respect to the dependency support test. But if
both alimony and support payments are due and the husband is in arrears, the payments
are treated as first applied to child support. Supra note 66.
84. Treas. Reg. § 152-1(a)(2)(iii)(b), unless made to a trust.
85. Gerald Ronnell Leslie, T.C. Memo 1971-44, where U.S. Savings Bonds purchased
for the future education of the children were excluded items; Gerald Ronnell Leslie, T.C.
Memo 1972-151, where the cost of housing the children in the husband's home while they
visited him and the cost of transporting the children back to their mother were exluded;
but see Philip J. Sciortino, T.C. Memo 1972-218 where the one-half of the rental value of
the house was deemed contributed by each because the house was equally owned by the
spouses, even though the mortgage payments were made by the husband.
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non-custodial parent has proved that he has provided over $1,200
for the support of the children, the custodial parent must prove that
she has provided support which is in excess of the amount provided
by the non-custodial parent." Therefore, the custodial parent must
constantly maintain records and cannot rely on the decree if there
is any possibility that the non-custodial parent may claim the ex-
emptions under the second exception."'
The general rule regarding dependency exemptions and the two
exceptions may become inoperative if the combined amounts spent
for child support by both parents do not exceed half of the child's
total support. This may occur where the child obtains employment,
where the child receives welfare," or where the child is supported
by a grandparent or stepparent.8 9
CHILD CARE DEDUCTIONS
The Internal Revenue Code provides0 that a working parent
may be allowed to deduct the expenses incurred for the care of
children under the age of fifteen, 1 for whom the parent is entitled
to a dependency exemption. Salaries paid to a housekeeper may
qualify,92 but the housekeeper cannot be a relative of the tax-
payer." Day Care or nursery school tuition may also qualify, but
normal school tuition does not. 4
If the parents are separated or divorced, then only the parent
86. REV. RUL. 72-591, 1972-2 C.B. 84, where household expenses paid by the custodial
parent were allocated in direct proportion to the number of people in the household. If there
are four members of the household and two are children, 1/4 of the household expenses are
considered as support for each child.
87. William G. Wohner, T.C. Memo 1972-237; Ruth L. Saubert, T.C. Memo 1973-11
where the wife was not allowed the exemptions based on estimates because she did not
provide documentation of her expenses; Elmer R. Johnson, T.C. Memo 1973-171, where
the wife was allowed the exemptions because she maintained meticulously accurate records
of all family expenses.
88. John A. Frazier, CCH Dec. 31, 830; T.C. Memo 1973-21 (1973).
89. REv. RUL. 73-175, 1973-16 I.R.B. 6.
90. § 214. Deductions must be itemized in order to take advantage of the provision.
Former § 214 was amended. At the time of this writing, the regulations have not been
proposed. Paul Lustig, 274 F. 2d 448, (9th Cir. 1960), (60-1 USTC 1 9248) where "support"
included child care expenses, even though a deduction was allowed.
91. § 214(b)(1)(A); if there are two or more children, it would appear that only the
expenses attributable to the children under fifteen are deductible.
92. § 215(b)(2).
93. § 214(e)(4); see § 152(a)(1-9) for definitions of relatives including parents, adult
children, but not cousins; Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(d)(2), relationships with in-laws are not
severed by divorce.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(f)(2)(iii) [5/17/71].
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
having custody of the child is entitled to make use of the child care
deduction. Therefore, during a divorce or separation, it is essential
that careful tax planning insure a working custodial parent the
right to the dependency exemptions for children under the age of
fifteen. If under the tax law, the non-custodial parent has the right
to the dependency exemption irrespective of the decree, then nei-
ther spouse may take advantage of this provision. In addition, the
custodial parent must furnish over half of the cost of maintaining
a household of which the qualifying child is a member.9" Expenses
of maintaining a household include property taxes, mortgage inter-
est, rent, utility charges, upkeep and repairs, property insurance,
and food. It does not include expenses for such items as clothing,
education, medical treatment, vacations, life insurance, payments
for mortgage principal or permanent household improvements.96 A
husband's payments of household expenses which are deductible by
him as indirect alimony are considered contributed by the wife
since such payments are taxable to her, and if the wife receives the
family home as part of the property settlement, then the fair rental
value is considered contributed by her.
Child care expenses are not deductible unless they are incurred
to enable the parent having custody of the child to be gainfully
employed. The deduction is allowed on a monthly basis so that if
employment continues for three months during the year, only three
months of child care expenses may be deductible. 7 However, the
amount of the deduction is limited by the location of the child care
services: services performed within the parent's home are limited
to $400 per month9" and services performed outside the parent's
home are limited to $200 per month for one qualifying child, $300
per month for two qualifying children, and $400 per month for
three or more qualifying children,99 with a combined maximum
deduction of $400 per month or $4,800 per year. For instance, a
part-time housekeeper is hired at a salary of $160 per month whose
duties included cleaning the house and caring for two small chil-
dren from the time they return from the Day Care Center until
their mother returns from her full-time job, and Day Care tuition
is $500 per month for the children. The taxpayer may deduct $400
95. § 214(b)(3); this requirement should be distinguished from the "support" require-
ment for the dependency exemption.
96. Treas. Regs. § 1.143-1(b)(4).
97. § 214(b)(2).
98. § 214(c)(1).
99. § 214(c)(2)(B).
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per month as a child care deduction: $300 for the tuition (because
there are two children) and the remaining $100 for the housekeeper.
The additional $260 per month is not deductible.
The $4,800 maximum yearly deduction is further restricted if
the parent's adjusted gross income for the year exceeds $18,000, i.e.
it is reduced $1.00 for every $2.00 of such excess."' For example,
if the parent's adjusted gross income for the year is $20,000 and
expenses for child care services performed in the home are $4,800
per year, the allowable deduction is limited to $3,800 [$20,000 -
$18,000 = $2,000; $4,800- $1,000 (/2 of $2,000) = $3,800]..There-
fore, if the adjusted gross income of the parent equals or exceeds
$27,600, the child care deduction is reduced to zero.
If a couple is married or is in the process of a divorce, the child
care deduction will only be allowed if a joint return is filed and both
parents are employed, with the $18,000 restriction applying to their
combined adjusted gross income."' However, a custodial parent
may be allowed to use the child care deduction if she files a sepa-
rate return in which she qualifies as a Head of Household and is
treated as not "married."10
LEGAL EXPENSES INCURRED DURING A DIVORCE
Occasionally, a client may inquire whether or not he can deduct
the legal expenses incurred during a marital dispute. In general, the
husband's payment of his own legal expenses or his contribution
toward his wife's legal expenses are not deductible. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a divorce action is primarily
personal and therefore legal expenses for such proceedings are not
deductible even if incurred to protect the husband's income produc-
ing property." 3 However, the Court of Claims has allowed a hus-
band to deduct that portion of his attorney's fees which was attrib-
utable to the attorney's time spent in advising the husband of the
tax consequences of the proceedings0 4 and in assuring that the
payments to the wife qualify as deductible alimony.0 5 A wife gen-
100. § 214(d).
101. § 214(e)(2); § 214(d).
102. § 214(e)(3). The dependency exemption is the controlling element to the child care
deduction, medical deductions for the children and the Heads of Households' rates.
103. U.S. v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963), (63-1 USTC 9285), involving a contested
divorce action.
104. Munn, Jr. v. U.S., 455 F. 2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972), (72-1 USTC 9255), where the
taxpayer was allowed to deduct 1/3 of the attorney's fees incurred in connection with his
divorce. Also § 212(3).
105. Carpenter v. U.S., 338 F. 2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964), (64-2 USTC 9842).
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erally cannot deduct the amount she pays for legal services in
connection with a marital settlement, but she can deduct attorney's
fees which are allocable to tax advice for herself and to her attor-
ney's time spent on producing taxable alimony."'
The attorney should therefore allocate his fees between deducti-
ble and nondeductible legal services and maintain accurate time
records which include the nature of his work in the event the Inter-
nal Revenue Service should question his client's deduction. Al-
though expenses incurred during a divorce involving the protection
of a client's title are not deductible, the attorney should make a
further allocation so that such fees when pertaining to income
producing property may be used to increase the client's basis.
106. Marian R. Hesse, 60 T.C. No. 72 (1973).
